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On 8 November 2016, Donald Trump was 
unexpectedly elected President of the United States, 
winning a total of 306 electoral college votes while 
losing the popular vote to Hillary Clinton by more than 
2 million. Since then, the Republican Party controls not 
only the Presidency, but also both Houses of Congress, 
having picked up seats in the House of Representatives 
and the Senate. Furthermore, Republican control is 
also expressed through a preponderance of 
governorships. 
Despite these political advantages, the Administration 
failed in its first big legislative initiative to repeal and 
replace Obamacare as a result of divisions within the 
Republican House of Representatives majority as well 
as the inability to attract votes from the Democrat 
side. Generally, the Administration faces a highly 
charged, politically divisive setting that casts a shadow 
across other parts of its agenda, for example, in the 
area of tax reform on which there are also divisions 
within Republican Congressional ranks as well as with 
the Democrat minority.  
A few months into its term, the basic contours of the 
Trump Administration’s domestic and foreign policies 
have begun to emerge. Many have ramifications for 
Europe in general and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) in 
particular. In its first weeks, the Administration moved 
forward with an array of initiatives—some more 
controversial than others—based for the most part on 
the fulfilment of promises made during the long and 
acrimonious presidential campaign. As his supporters 
and critics alike would agree, Donald Trump said what 
he meant and meant what he said, to judge from his 
actions since taking office. The result is an increasingly 
polarized debate.  
This policy brief considers the Trump Administration’s 
key conceptual pillars regarding foreign policy and 
how they play out with regard to Europe and the EU, 
focussing on security relations and the relations with 
Russia.  
Uncertainties and Caveats 
Any projection based on such preliminary information, 
however, is subject to important caveats and 
qualifications. Most obvious is the possibility, and even 
the likelihood, that unforeseen events will intervene – 
as 9/11 did in the case of the George W. Bush 
Administration – to alter dramatically and swiftly even 
Executive Summary 
• President Trump’s policy agenda is based 
on essentially three conceptual pillars: (1) 
strong defense/national security; (2) 
economic nationalism; and (3) dismantling 
the regulatory state. 
• Far from retreating into isolationism, the 
Trump Administration has begun to use the 
instruments of national power (military, 
diplomatic, economic) in support of clearly 
articulated foreign policy goals. 
• Alliances, including NATO, remain vitally 
important, provided they serve twenty-
first-century US interests, and allies bear 
their fair share of the defense burden. 
• The Administration took early steps, as 
evidenced not only in its senior national 
security appointments, but also in sending 
them on visits to Europe to reassure NATO-
European allies about the continuing US 
transatlantic commitment. 
• Like many of its predecessors, the 
Administration already confronts the 
necessity of adapting to a world not of its 
own making, which imposes constraints 
and unanticipated challenges that must be 
addressed. 
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the most carefully calculated priorities and strategies. 
Arguably, the world of 2017 is no less disorderly than 
that of the beginning of this new century that featured 
the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon. Circumstances may conspire to make either 
Europe more important, or of lower priority, in the 
Administration’s global strategic calculations. The 
potential exists for upheavals and security challenges in 
each of the regions of strategic importance to the 
United States that would have ramifications for the 
relationship between the United States and Europe. No 
administration in memory has adequately foreseen the 
changes that challenged and often swept away the 
conceptual foundations of the foreign policy agenda 
with which it entered office. The issue is not whether 
there will be such challenges, but how they will be 
addressed. 
The Trump Administration’s Conceptual Pillars 
With such uncertainty in mind, it is nevertheless 
possible, based on its words and deeds thus far, to set 
forth and discuss three mutually reinforcing priorities 
that will guide the Trump Administration in its approach 
to Europe and the EU. These priorities can be stated as 
the basis for three key conceptual pillars:  
• A stronger national security capability calling 
for more than 50 billion dollars to be added to 
the US defense budget, stepped-up efforts to 
defeat and destroy the so-called Islamic State 
(ISIS), and major efforts to better control US 
borders;  
• Economic nationalism that does not reject free 
trade but instead calls for ‘fair trade’ and the 
growth of the American economy based on 
renegotiating international trade agreements 
and revising the tax code to encourage the 
repatriation of capital and greater investment 
in job creation in the United States; and  
• The dismantling of the regulatory state in order 
to increase private-sector incentives and 
thereby unleash economic growth. 
Undoubtedly, the commitment to deregulation, 
together with greater decentralization, blends 
over to shape Trump’s view of the EU and other 
international multilateral organizations whose 
bureaucracies and regulatory capabilities are 
perceived to intrude upon the nation-state.  
Each of these three pillars favours certain initiatives and 
provides the basis for concrete policies that have 
implications for the others and will shape the new 
Administration’s approach to the transatlantic 
economic relationship in general and the EU in 
particular. For example, reducing the powers of the 
regulatory state is designed to stimulate economic 
growth, just as economic growth is intended to bolster 
national security by increasing resources available for a 
stronger military in support of US national interest. 
Moreover, Trump’s focus on nationalism and national 
interest, with an emphasis on immigration policy and 
border security, cuts across the divide between foreign 
policy and domestic policy. Other Trump Administration 
priorities, linked to the second and third conceptual 
pillars, include a trade policy that contains a preference 
for bilateral agreements, together with a controversial 
border adjustment tax designed to stimulate exports 
and tax imports. The new Administration’s defense 
policy features the rebuilding of US military capabilities 
and the rejuvenation of alliances alongside a greater 
sharing of defense burdens with allies. President Trump 
has rejected any notion that he is an isolationist, 
preferring instead to emphasize his commitment to 
international engagement based on the delineation of a 
clear US national interest and creating a more level 
playing field for US trade, as evidenced in its early 
actions against the Trans-Pacific Trade Partnership.  
In addressing these priorities, the Trump Administration 
faces a dilemma in moving forward with a 
comprehensive strategy based upon its ‘Make America 
Great’ slogan. In itself, this is a worthy effort to 
galvanize an American national spirit in support of the 
three priorities outlined above. However, during the 
presidential campaign, the idea of ‘Make America Great 
Again’ was understandably focused on domestic policy. 
Inevitably, this domestic policy emphasis cannot be 
addressed in isolation from its inextricably intertwined 
international implications and consequences, just as the 
reverse is equally true, given the ramifications of 
international events for the domestic setting. 
Cancellation of the Trans-Pacific Trade Partnership, for 
example, is designed to have short-term domestic, 
political, and economic benefits that must be weighed 
against the prospect of ceding to China a greater role in 
Asia-Pacific economic relationships. By the same token, 
given the great importance of the transatlantic trade 
relationship, the future of the EU, including its 
continued cohesion and prosperity, has important 
consequences for the US economy. In short, American 
‘greatness’ cannot be addressed or achieved except in a 
strategy that extends across the domestic and 
international domains. This is a reality that the new 
Administration is beginning to confront and address. 
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National Security and the Transatlantic Relationship 
While Barack Obama was sometimes called the first 
post-American president - referring to his globalist 
predilections - Trump’s ‘America First’ slogan should not 
be confused with the movement of the same name that 
opposed US entry into World War II before Pearl 
Harbor. Instead, the Trump Administration seeks a 
more precisely defined basis for US overseas operations 
in keeping with a more narrowly considered conception 
of national interest, perhaps in the realist foreign policy 
tradition. Such an approach contrasts sharply with the 
isolationism to which some Americans once subscribed 
in earlier eras. President Trump’s foreign policy 
concept, based first and foremost on US nationalism, 
translates into a Reaganesque belief that the basis for a 
more peaceful world is a stronger America, or as Reagan 
often put it himself, ‘peace through strength’, a theme 
echoed in the same words by President Trump. For him, 
the only viable basis for political order is the nation-
state, to which mass loyalties are drawn, rather than a 
more abstract regionalism or globalism. It follows that 
such a perspective already shapes the Administration’s 
attitudes toward such international entities as the EU 
and the UN. 
Therefore, it is no accident that Trump resonates with 
those on both sides of the Atlantic who reject globalism 
based on people and trade moving ever more freely and 
uncontrollably across national frontiers, producing 
some winners and many losers, and resulting in a 
backlash against globalism and the global elites who he 
believes have been its principal beneficiaries. In 
practice, this means a greater US affinity with Brexit and 
sympathy with those who challenge the assumption 
that increasing international integration, whether in 
Europe or elsewhere, is welcome as a twenty-first-
century manifestation of globalism.  
In late February, the new Administration in a gesture 
undoubtedly intended to signal the continuing 
importance attached to transatlantic relations sent 
Vice-President Pence and Secretary of Defense Mattis 
to meet with NATO allies both in Brussels and at the 
Munich Security Conference. Vice-President Pence, 
speaking as he specifically pointed out on behalf of 
President Trump, expressed ‘the strong commitment of 
the United States to continue cooperation and 
partnership with the European Union’. He further 
elaborated the need for greater coordination and 
intelligence-sharing in the global war against terrorism, 
together with the need both to hold Russia accountable 
and to search for ‘new ways for new common ground 
with Russia’. Both in Vice-President Pence’s public 
statements and in those of Secretary of Defense Mattis, 
the Administration set forth themes that could have 
been stated by any of his predecessors: the 
commitment to a unified, peaceful, and prosperous 
Europe; the importance of NATO as ‘the fundamental 
bedrock for keeping the peace and defending the 
freedoms we enjoy today’; and the ‘rock-solid’ US 
commitment to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, in 
which an attack upon one is regarded as an attack upon 
all. Each of these themes has long been a part of 
transatlantic dialogue, therefore representing elements 
of continuity in US security policy toward NATO Europe. 
Another major theme is the recurring burden-sharing 
discussion, in which the United States for many decades 
has called for greater NATO-European contributions to 
the common defense. During the Cold War, it should be 
recalled, there was continuing discussion of the need 
for real increases of 3 percent of GDP for defense on the 
part of NATO-European members. Today the Trump 
Administration reiterates, and gives greater emphasis 
to, the calls of its predecessor for European 
contributions to NATO totaling 2 percent of GDP to 
defense.  
In addition to the transatlantic trips by the Vice-
President and Secretary of Defense, President Trump 
met in Washington, D.C., first with British Prime 
Minister Theresa May and subsequently with Israeli 
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel. Having already met with 
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe during the 
Presidential transition, Trump later hosted Abe at Mar-
a-Lago in Florida. It can be plausibly argued that the 
Administration demonstrated a priority attachment to 
allies, not only by these early actions, but also by 
establishing a more cordial relationship with Egypt’s 
President al-Sisi, who received a warm welcome at the 
White House in early April. Such early gestures, of which 
others could be cited, point to a reversal of the Obama 
Administration’s policy of shunning Egypt out of 
concern for human rights issues despite Cairo’s 
geopolitical importance to the United States in the 
Middle East. Presumably this means that the Trump 
Administration will reward allies and penalize 
adversaries. Emphasis will be placed on building 
partnerships with countries that align with US interests 
in place of strategies that give priority to building 
relationships with enemies. Furthermore, Secretary of 
State Tillerson’s Asia-Pacific trip in March can be seen 
as an indication of the importance attached by the 
Administration to the looming crisis potential in the 
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Korean peninsula and South China Sea. In the Middle 
East, the Administration has stepped up its support for 
military operations designed to eradicate ISIS. This 
includes an increased US military presence in Syria and 
Iraq and undoubtedly an understanding that a longer-
term US commitment will need to be made in order to 
assure future stability. Such concerns represent 
longstanding US policy priorities and key issues that 
have faced the United States for many years. Thus, in 
this sense there is great continuity in US national 
security policy. Of course, how the Asia-Pacific area and 
the Middle East play out in the months ahead will have 
important implications once again for transatlantic 
relations. 
Russia Policy 
Another major set of issues shaping the transatlantic 
relationship flows inevitably from the Administration’s 
evolving Russia policy. Paradoxically, the allegations of 
Russian interference during the 2016 Presidential 
campaign have driven Republicans and Democrats into 
a role reversal, with some but not all of Republicans, led 
by the President himself, initially seeking an improved 
relationship with Russia, and Democrats pressing for 
tougher policies to punish Moscow. How the US-Russia 
relationship unfolds, of course, will have important 
implications for transatlantic relations. For example, the 
signals that the Administration has sent to Moscow on 
issues of the Baltic states and Ukraine come 
immediately to mind, together with the role that the 
Administration envisages for Russia in other regional 
settings from the Asia-Pacific area to the Middle East 
and the war against ISIS. Ideally, the Administration 
would have wished to draw Russia into a more 
constructive relationship that would have detached the 
country from Tehran and Damascus. Clearly, this is not 
likely under present circumstances. Instead, the 
Administration has been compelled by events to take an 
increasingly tough line on such issues, as evidenced in 
its response to Bashar al-Assad’s use of chemical 
weapons in early April. Whatever expectations the 
Administration may have had for an improved 
relationship with Russia – a perennial hope on the part 
of incoming administrations since World War II –  
appear to have been dashed. Senior officials, including 
Secretary of State Tillerson, Secretary of Defense 
Mattis, Vice-President Pence, as well as President 
Trump himself, have denounced Russian policies in 
Ukraine and elsewhere. Furthermore, the 
Administration’s calls for increases in defense spending, 
including both the US defense budget and greater 
burden-sharing by Europeans within NATO, cannot be 
viewed favourably in Moscow. The Russia election-
meddling investigation in Washington, together with 
the evolving geopolitical landscape, arguably only lead 
the Administration to a reaffirmation of basic security 
policies, including the transatlantic relationship as part 
of a broader global strategic architecture. This will 
remain a work in progress that necessarily will contain 
elements of continuity along with change as President 
Trump puts in his own unique imprimatur on US 
national security policy.  
Conclusion 
Although the bold outline of the Administration’s policy 
approach, including relations with Europe, is 
increasingly apparent, its details will only be worked out 
in the interplay between unfolding circumstances, 
constraints, and opportunities. In early April, the crises 
on the Korean peninsula and in the Middle East 
provided vivid evidence of this interplay. In the case of 
North Korea, the Administration’s approach was to 
deploy military power as a signal of intent to Pyongyang 
alongside diplomatic efforts to enlist China to support 
US policy. In the case of Syria, having launched cruise 
missile strikes in response to Syrian use of chemical 
weapons, incidentally coinciding in time with a meeting 
with China’s President Xi Jinping at Mar-a-Lago, 
President Trump subsequently offered to work with 
China to resolve trade issues in return for Beijing’s 
efforts to against North Korea. Furthermore, Secretary 
of State Tillerson’s sharp tone in Moscow on Russia’s 
role in Syria contrasted with President Trump’s effort to 
entice China into a cooperative relationship on the 
Korean peninsula. Whatever else we may infer from 
such actions, they demonstrate a high level of political-
diplomatic agility alongside a willingness possibly to link 
security and trade policies. If this is the case in a broader 
sense, it may bode well for transatlantic cooperation on 
a range of issues. For example, a greater willingness on 
the part of NATO-European countries to meet U.S. 
expectations on defense spending might open the way 
to a more accommodating transatlantic approach on 
trade and other issues of importance to the EU. 
Altogether, this points to the need for NATO-Europe 
and the EU to attempt to accommodate US interest as 
much as is politically possible and for the United States 
to take similar steps towards its European partners. 
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